In pre-war Japan, many banks were controlled by industrial companies through capital and personal relationships. Those banks are known as "organ banks" (kikan ginko). Organ banks engaged in unsound lending to their related companies, which resulted in damage to the banks' financial positions and consequently destabilized the financial system. This is a popularly held view of the financial history of pre-war Japan (organ bank hypothesis). However, this view has been based largely on case studies and casual observations. In this paper we examine the organ bank hypothesis using quantitative data and econometric methodology. To measure the extent of connections between banks and non-banking companies, we compiled a comprehensive database of directors and auditors of banks and non-banking companies in 1926. It was found that interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies was very pervasive. More than 80% of ordinary banks had at least one director or auditor who was at the same time a director or auditor of at least one non-banking company. Also, regression analyses confirmed that director interlocking had a negative effect on bank performance, especially for smaller banks.
Introduction
It is well known that the financial system in postwar Japan was bank-based, and that it was characterized by the "main bank system".
1 However, in pre-war Japan, a large part of industrial investment was financed by equity and, correspondingly, large shareholders played a major role in corporate governance. 2 Banks basically were not active in monitoring industrial companies in pre-war Japan. In fact, many banks were controlled by the owners of industrial companies.
Banks controlled by industrial companies were called "organ banks" (kikan ginko) 3 , and have been regarded as characterizing the pre-war Japanese financial system. According to the literature, a typical organ bank was established to generate funding for the industrial businesses of the bank founders.
Therefore, an organ bank was not managed for its own profitability, but rather for the benefit of the corporate group with which it was affiliated. Consequently, organ banks tended to advance a large amount of loans to a small number of industrial companies connected with the bank founders. 4 Furthermore, many researchers have pointed out that organ banks engaged in unsound lending to their related companies without diversifying the portfolios, which damaged the banks' financial positions, and destabilized the financial system. This view has become well established in today's literature on Japanese financial history. And, some regard the organ bank relationship as a basic cause of the 1927 Showa Financial Crisis.
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On the other hand, recent literature in the field of banking and finance has made it clear that this kind of bank-firm relationship ("related lending") can be widely observed in today's developing
The modern history of the banking industry in Japan started with the National Bank Act in 1872.
The national banks were private banks that were granted the privilege of issuing banknotes. After revision of the Act in 1876, which suspended the convertibility of national banknotes, the number of national banks grew rapidly to reach 153, the upper limit prescribed by the National Bank Act, in 1879.
In 1882, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was established as the central bank, and in 1885 it began to issue bank notes convertible to silver, resulting in a further revision to the National Bank Act, which obliged national banks to convert into ordinary banks within twenty years of establishment.
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Enactment of the 1893 Bank Act as the legislative framework for ordinary banks brought about a rapid increase in their number. In 1901, the number of ordinary banks approached the peak of 1890.
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These ordinary banks had the following notable characteristics: Although deposits into ordinary banks grew rapidly, the ratio of banks' equity to deposits remained high until the early twentieth century. In 1901, equity accounted for 36% of the total liabilities of ordinary banks. 12 Also, at the beginning of the twentieth century, ordinary banks depended heavily on borrowings from the BOJ. 13 In this sense, the ordinary banks differed from that of the typical modern bank based on deposits.
The ratio of deposits to total bank liabilities increased in the 1900s. This was primarily due to a change in the BOJ policy. Until 1897, the BOJ was open-handed in lending to private banks, and the banks earned substantial profits from the interest rate spread between borrowings from the BOJ and loans to non-banking companies. However, in 1897 the BOJ initiated direct lending to non-banking companies, in order to prevent banks from earning profits from the interest rate spread. 14 This policy change was aimed at pressuring banks to decrease their borrowings from the BOJ, and to focus on attracting deposits.
At the same time, the number of ordinary banks began declining, due to bank failures and mergers.
In the 1910s, the First World War had a substantial impact on the banking sector, and on the Japanese economy as a whole. Deposits increased rapidly, due to economic growth and an expansionary monetary policy. Consequently, the average equity-liability ratio of ordinary banks fell below 20%.
And ordinary banks began resembling typical modern banks, at least in terms of the composition of liabilities. Meanwhile, during the War boom, many ordinary banks advanced large amounts to industrial companies, especially those in the heavy and chemical industries. In many cases, these companies faced difficulties when the War ended and international competition revived, which in turn led to a considerable number of bank loans becoming non-performing. Because the equity-liabilities ratio of banks had substantially declined during the 1910s, the deterioration of banks' assets seriously damaged their financial positions. This was the fundamental cause of the instability of the financial system in the 1920s.
The bank panic of 1920 saw many banks, particularly smaller ones, close down. In order to secure stability of the financial market, the government initiated an organizational reform of the banking sector in the early 1920s, imposing entry regulations and promoting mergers. 15 The 1923 Great Earthquake in Tokyo further destabilized the financial market, because the earthquake, many of the assets that had been used as collateral for bank loans, or were expected to generate cash flow to repay the loans, were destroyed or burnt.
In 1926, the government decided to implement fundamental measures to restructure the financial system, and proposed two draft bills designed to dispose of the bad loans. However, the Diet opposed these bills on the grounds that they favoured capitalists connected to the government. Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi ; Takahashi and Morigaki, Showa Kinyu Kyoko; Ishii, "Hyaku Sanju Ginko ." 19 The Bank Act, enacted in 1893, imposed a regulation that restricted loans and discounts by a bank to a single customer to no more than 10% of the bank's capital. However, due to the objections of bankers and industrialists, this regulation was rescinded in 1895 (Patrick , "Japan") . 20 "All loans minus loans to related borrowers" might not be equal to actual loans to the unrelated larger proportion of unsecured loans among the related loans, and the percentage of unrecoverable loans was higher among related loans than among total loans. Thus, at least in respect of the closed banks, lending to related groups was likely to be based on some degree of corrupt relationship, beyond proper financial judgement.
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For a more detailed insight into how and why these banks failed, we looked at two cases, Nakazawa Bank and Murai Bank, from BOJ. 22 Nakazawa Bank was established in 1897 by Hikokichi Nakazawa. At the end of 1925, the Nakazawa family still owned more than 90% of the bank's shares.
When Yoshikazu Nakazawa became the third president of the bank, he was the second largest shareholder. At the same time, he was a director of seven non-banking companies owned by him and his family. 23 Over 90% of Nakazawa Bank's loans were made to the Nakazawa group (Panel A of Appendix Table 1 ). However, in the 1920s the businesses of the Nakazawa group got into trouble, and some group companies failed as a result of speculative investment in stock. Nakazawa Bank had no option but to continue lending money to the Nakazawa group. Finally, as the business situation of the Nakazawa group steadily worsened, Nakazawa Bank was forced to close during the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927.
Murai Bank was established in 1904 by the Murai family. At the end of 1926, Murai Bank was still wholly owned by the Murai family, which also provided all the bank's board members. As in the case of Nakazawa Bank, the Murai family operated several non-banking businesses, including trading, mining, agriculture and real estate enterprises. As a result, the loan portfolio of Murai Bank was skewed toward four non-banking companies owned by the Murai family (Panel A of Appendix Table 1 ). Despite the borrowers, since we cannot always get the data of loans to all the related borrowers. 21 Moreover, we can confirm that 13 of the 15 banks in Appendix Table 1 had director interlocking with non-banking companies, according to the data of Ginko Kaisha Yoroku. 22 Bank of Japan. "Sho Kyugyo Ginko". 23 BOJ, "Sho Kyugyo" provided no information on the ownership structure of Nakazawa-related companies. So, we checked the ownership structure of the four related companies whose business reports were available, namely Kinsen Inryo, Sapporo Mokuzai, Taiwan Takushoku and Toshin Gomukogyo. It is confirmed that Yoshikazu Nakazawa was the major shareholder in all four companies.
Murai Group foundering in the 1920s, Murai Bank continued to lend them money. Eventually, Murai
Bank was forced to close in 1927, due to a combination of defaults on bad loans to the Murai group defaulting, and the Great Earthquake.
The government perceived that the organ bank relationship was inimical to a sound banking system. The Bank Law of 1927 compelled ordinary banks to be registered as joint-stock companies, and to be capitalized at not less than one million yen. 24 According to the Bank Law, existing banks whose capital was currently below the minimum limit ("unqualified banks") had to meet the capital criterion within seven years. In addition, executive directors and managers of ordinary banks were prohibited from engaging in other businesses without the approval of the Minister of Finance. 
Interlocking between Banks and Non-banking Companies
In pre-war Japan, wealth distribution was far from equal, and there were a number of wealthy individuals who were large shareholders of many companies, concurrently. 26 Furthermore, in many cases those large shareholders held directorships in the companies in which they invested. 27 The ownership and governance structure of banks was part of this picture. Large investors owned shares and held directorships in banks as well as industrial companies, as we will see in this section. To put it another way, they created business groups that included banks as well as industrial companies. It is said that, in many of these cases, the banks were not managed for their own profitability but rather for the primary purpose of generating funding companies within the same group . Ginko Kaisha Youroku, 1926 issue. 33 In the following section, we discuss the possibility of selection bias in our data sampling. Table 2 show the data broken down by position with the bank. In respect of 48% of total observations, the top executives of the banks held at least one position of director or auditor of a non-banking company, and the average number of interlocks in which the banks' top executives were involved was 1.48. On the other hand, as shown in Panel D, the percentage of banks in which at least one ordinary director held a position of director or auditor of a non-banking company was 68.5%, and the average number of interlocks of the banks' ordinary directors was 3.48. From these results, we can safely say that most ordinary banks were connected with non-banking companies through the interlocking of directors and auditors. Table 3 is a breakdown of Panel A of Table 2 by scale of banks. We split the 1,007 observations into three equal groups in terms of bank assets. We defined smaller banks as banks in the 0-33.3 percentile in terms of asset level, medium-sized banks as banks in the 33.3-66.7 percentile, and large banks as banks in the 66.7-100 percentile. The first point to note is that the interlocking of directors and auditors with non-banking companies pervaded all three groups. However, in a relative sense, interlocking with non-banking companies was more pervasive among the large banks. This remains true when we break down the data by positions with non-banking companies. In all sub-categories of the data, both the percentage of banks with interlocking positions and the average number of interlocks were greatest in the large banks.
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The results from our database are striking, and the facts support the conjecture of Kato on the pervasiveness of the organ bank relationship. 36 More than 80% of the ordinary banks were connected to non-banking companies through the interlocking of directors and auditors. 37 Moreover, the interlocking was more pervasive in the large banks. However, the fact of interlocking does not by itself mean that there was an organ bank relationship in the sense discussed in Section 1. It is necessary to examine in more detail the nature and influence of the interlocking shown by Table 2 and Table 3 .
For this purpose, we looked first at the cases of the ten banks with the greatest number of interlocks, Bank (43). 38 In seven of the ten banks the presidents were one of the ten largest shareholders of these banks. In this sense, management of those banks was not distinct from ownership. Furthermore, in many of the cases where bank presidents directed or audited non-banking companies, they were also major 35 Breaking down the data by position in the bank, we confirmed that the situation was almost the same (not reported in table) . 36 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron. 37 We also checked the extent of director interlocking among non-banking companies. While the number of non-banking companies that had at least one interlocking director with a ordinary bank was 3113, Tokyo Koshinjo, Ginko Kaisha covered 9644 non-banking companies. Therefore, 32.2% of non-banking companies covered in Tokyo Koshijo, Ginko Kaisha had at least one interlocked director with a ordinary bank. 38 The numbers in parentheses denote the number of interlocks.
shareholders of those companies. Therefore, we can say that the interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies was based primarily shared common major shareholders.
This also implies that the nature of director interlocking between banks and non-banking companies in pre-war Japan was essentially different from that in the main bank relationship in postwar Japan. 39 In postwar Japan, the main bank, not its major shareholders, seconds employees as directors of the borrowing companies for the purpose of monitoring their performance. In addition, "contingent governance" is a characteristic of corporate governance under the main bank relationship. Contingent governance means that the governance of a company is contingent on its financial state. If a company runs into financial problems, the main bank initiates management intervention to restructure the bank, by seconding directors . 40 Hence, under the postwar main bank system, it is the poor financial position of a company that motivates the personal connection with its main bank. The cases of above ten banks suggest that this causality was not usual in pre-war Japan, because director interlocking essentially reflected the common ownership between the banks and non-banking companies.
Influence of Governance Structure on Bank Performance

Interlocking and Bank Profitability
In this section we quantitatively examine the influence of interlocking on bank performance.
Because the following analysis in this subsection focuses on bank profitability, and specifically the return on equity (ROE), as a measure for bank performance, we initially considered using a simple model for bank returns. There are many studies on the determinants of bank profitability that propose various models, according to the kinds of problems the authors were analyzing. However, most of the literature 39 Since seconded directors usually resign from the bank's board, the director interlocking that we focus on in this paper is not observed in the postwar main bank system. 40 Aoki, Sheard, and Patrick, "Main Bank".
considers three factors as important determinants of bank profitability: economies of scale, the level of external competition, and the attitude to risk. 41 In addition to these three factors, we consider loan quality to be a factor affecting the profitability of a bank, because we cannot assume that loan quality was homogeneous among banks in pre-war Japan. Actually, it is the essence of the organ bank hypothesis that the quality of loans of those banks controlled by non-banking companies was low. Therefore, the baseline model is as follows:
where LQ, COM, RISK and ES refer to the variables indicating loan quality, level of competition, attitude to risk, and economies of scale, respectively. We now briefly discuss these four variables, and the control variables used in estimation:
(1) Loan quality (LQ). Loan quality (loan performance, rate of recovery of bad loans, etc.) is a factor that directly affects bank profitability. According to the organ bank hypothesis, banks with strong ties to business groups engaged in unsound lending to the related companies. To capture the organ bank relationship, we use the variable, INTERLOCK, which indicates the number of interlocks for each bank, as defined in section 3. Here, we assume that the larger the INTERLOCK value, the stronger the connection with the related business group. Therefore, if the organ bank hypothesis holds, the effect of INTERLOCK on ROE is negative. In addition, we take into account the effect of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 on loan quality, because many banks in the South Kanto area suffered from bad loan problems as a result of this natural disaster. 42 To capture this effect, we use the earthquake dummy variable, EQ, which takes the value, "one," if the headquarters of the bank was located in the South Kanto area, i.e., Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama prefectures. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient of EQ to be negative.
(2) Level of Competition (COM). According to the standard oligopoly theory in the industry organization literature, banks in highly concentrated markets are able to enjoy higher interest rates charged on loans, and lower interest rates paid on deposits. Most studies on the determinants of bank profitability in the United States and Europe focus on the effects of market concentration. 43 However, it should be noted that in the case of pre-war Japan the extent of competition in the banking industry differed by operating region 44 . Therefore, it is necessary to measure the effects of market concentration by region. In the following analysis, we class a prefecture as a separate market. Then, in order to capture the effect of market concentration, we use the variable, MARKET, which is the market share of the top three banks, defined as their number of branch offices as a proportion of all bank branch offices in the prefecture. 45 The coefficient of MARKET is expected to be positive.
(3) Attitude to risk (RISK). The attitude of banks to risk has been regarded as an important determinant of bank profitability. 46 If the management and shareholders of a bank are strongly risk-averse and maintain a high proportion of safe assets, the bank is unlikely to earn large profits, but is 42 Losses from this earthquake amounted to about 5 billion yen, which was equivalent to about 30% of GNP at that time (Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing) . 43 See Goddard et al. European Banking, Chapter 4, which provides a review of literature on the relationship between market structure and bank performance. 44 Imuta, "Nihon"; Teranishi, Nihon no Keiza Hatteni 45 Unfortunately, we could not access information on the individual amounts of loans or deposits by prefecture, with respect to banks operating in multiple prefectures. Even if we replace the share of the top three banks with the share of the top single bank, the effect of market concentration is positive and statistically insignificant, as is the case if we use the share of the top three banks. 46 Bouke, "Concentration"; Berger, "The Profit-Structure"; Goddard, Molyneux , and Wilson. European Banking; Goddard, Molyneux , and Wilson. "The Profitability",etc.
also less likely to be exposed to risk. To capture the effect of asset risk, we include the variable, SECURITY, which is the ratio of security holdings to assets. 47 Here, we assume that securities were relatively safe assets, since they were mainly government bonds and debentures issued by major companies. However, the indications of this coefficient are not clear a priori, because its value depends on the relative average returns of loans and securities. Indeed, it is quite possible that when overall corporate performance slowed down after the collapse of the wartime boom in 1920, the profitability of a bank holding more safe assets would have been higher than that of a bank holding more risky assets.
Actually, Hoshi confirmed that banks forced to close in 1927 and 1930-1932 had relatively low proportions of security holdings. 48 It is also necessary to take into account the effect of the capital structure. We use the variable, LEVERAGE, indicating the financial leverage of a bank, following
Modigliani and Miller's PropositionⅡ, which states that the expected return on equity increases relative to increasing financial leverage.
(4) Economies of scale (ES).
Most studies on bank profitability use bank size to capture economies of scale. Because depositors were not protected by a deposit insurance system in pre-war Japan, large banks might have benefited from their greater credibility when it came to attracting deposits.
To capture the effect of bank size, we use the variable, SIZE, indicating the natural log value of the bank assets. If a large bank benefited from economies of scale, the coefficient of SIZE would be positive. In sum, the equation to be estimated is as follows: In addition to the estimation using full samples, we estimated Equation (2) We also found that all of the 19 largest banks with assets of more than one hundred million yen, including zaibatsu banks, had their headquarters in the urban area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, and Hyogo prefectures). 55 Hoshi, "Back to the Future" found that the percentage of loans by zaibatsu banks to companies within the same business groups was lower than that of typical organ banks which closed during the Showa Financial Crisis, according to data of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Banks covering the period 1921-43. 56 Imuta, "Taishoki"; Sugiyama, "Gomeigaisha"; Murakami, "Futsu Ginko".
fund regional industry. 57 Shiratori [2001] showed that most of the banks that failed in the 1920s, due to improper management by the directors, were small and medium-sized banks in rural areas. Therefore, it is worthwhile to estimate Equation (2) separately by bank size. This allows us to check the differences in effect of the organ bank relationship, and also of control variables, between la.rge banks and smaller banks. The total 1,007 observations were divided into three percentile sub-samples, large, medium and small, as seen in Table 3 . 58 Percentile criteria are preferable to criteria based on particular asset levels, in order to avoid arbitrariness.
59 Table 4 presents basic statistics on the banks in our samples (Panel A), as well as on the banks excluded from our samples (Panel B) . 60 It is difficult to quantify the sample selection bias precisely, because we have no information on director interlocking among excluded banks, but it is useful to have a comparison between the basic characteristics of our sample banks and those of the excluded banks. As stated above, the data in Tokyo Koshinjo are basically limited to banks whose paid-in capital was greater than two hundred thousand yen. 61 Hence, banks in the samples are much larger in terms of the natural log of assets (SIZE) than excluded banks. As regards profitability, the excluded banks were more profitable than banks in the samples, especially in terms of ROE. 62 Also, the standard deviation of excluded banks is extremely high compared to that of the banks in the samples. This is consistent with
Teranishi , who noted that, because smaller banks frequently made unsecured loans or loans based on real 57 Teranishi, Nihon no Keizai. 58 Alternatively, we could have checked the difference in effects of director interlocking by bank size, by adding the interaction term, SIZE*INTERLOCK to Equation (2). However, this formulation is more restrictive, because it assumes a linear relationship between the marginal effect of director interlocking on bank profitability and bank size. 59 In addition to the sub-sample analyses by bank size, we also conducted several tests, distinguishing urban areas from rural areas. However, since the differences in the estimated results of sub-sample analyses by area were not as pronounced as those by bank size, we report only the latter in the out the possibility that the higher ROE of excluded banks is due to left censoring, given that the variance in ROE of the excluded banks is higher than that of the banks in the samples. In respect of most of the other variables, we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis that the banks in the samples equal the excluded banks. 64 In sum, at least there is no strong evidence that our sample selection is pre-biased in order to lend weight to the organ bank hypothesis.
65 Table 5 presents the estimation results of Equation (2). Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the full samples. It can be confirmed from Column 1 that the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that director interlocking between banks and non-banking companies had a negative effect on bank profitability. The positive coefficient of SIZE implies the economies of scale. As we expected, the earthquake dummy (EQ) had a negative effect on bank profitability. The effect of market concentration (MARKET) is positive, as standard oligopoly theory predicts, but its statistical significance is not high. Finally, banks that ranked higher on proportion of security holdings were more profitable. One interpretation is that this reflects the low return on loans due to the poor performance of industrial companies during the long depression that followed World War I.
In Column 2, we include the variable of LEVERAGE. The coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) still showed a strong negative effect on bank profitability. Consistent with MM's proposition Ⅱ, the 63 See Green Econometric Analysis, Chapter 20. It is shown that the expected value of a left (right) censored variable increases (decreases) with its variance. 64 We conducted both t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test. In both tests, SECURITY is statistically not equal between banks in the samples and excluded banks. 65 We estimated Equation (2) by sample selection model, where the selection equation included SIZE, SECURITY and area dummies. Then, it was confirmed that the results were fairly similar to those of the baseline analysis (Table 5) . coefficient of LEVERAGE is positive. Alternatively, this positive effect could be explained by differences in individual funding costs of deposits, given that high financial leverage reflects strong ability to attract deposits. Actually, it is noted that banks that were less able to attract deposits offered higher interest rates on deposits, in order to prevent an outflow of their existing deposits. 66 On the other hand, the positive effect of bank size is no longer significant. This may be because LEVERAGE is highly correlated with SIZE (ρ=0.49). Hence, it is likely that LEVERAGE partially absorbs the effect of bank size. As for other variables, the estimated results are qualitatively the same as those of Column 1. percentile) are reported in Columns 3-4, 5-6, and 7-8, respectively. The coefficient of LN (INTERLOCK) is negative and statistically significant for smaller and medium-sized banks. On the other hand, director interlocking had no significant effect on large banks. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is substantially greater for the smaller and medium-sized banks than for the large banks. These results indicate that the unfavourable nature of director interlocking with non-banking companies was specific to 66 Teranishi, Nihon no Keizai Hatten. 67 It is calculated from the difference of the predicted values when the value of INTERLOCK is changed from zero to mean, evaluated at the means of the other variables . 68 We conducted a multivariate outlier test (Hadi, "Identifying") , and identified 22 outliers. After eliminating these outliers, the estimated results indicated that the negative effect of INTERLOCK was slightly attenuated, but still statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, while the effects of other variables were not substantially changed. medium-sized and smaller banks. 69 Finally, we address some problems potential to the above results to check the robustness. First, it is possible that non-banking companies might have seconded directors and auditors to poor-performing banks in an attempt to rescue and restructure them. 70 However, none of the many case studies of organ banks report that non-banking companies seconded directors and auditors to banks in order to rescue them. Bank of Japan reports the histories, from establishment to bankruptcy, of the twenty banks that closed during the Showa Financial Crisis. 71 Twelve of the twenty banks failed due more or less to unsound loans related to their directors, and that in none of these twelve cases had the related non-banking companies seconded directors to those banks when their performance changed for the worse.
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Second, it is useful to check the results using alternative measures of director interlocking. In the previous analyses, we used the number of director interlocks (INTERLOCK), i.e., the total number of director or auditor positions held in non-banking companies by the directors and auditors of each bank, as a proxy of the strength of connection between banks and companies. Here, we consider two other proxies. The first candidate is the number of non-banking companies related to each bank via director 69 Alternatively, we can add the interaction term of INTERLOCK and SIZE in Equation (2), in order to examine the relationship between the effect of director interlocking and bank size. If, as bank size increased, the negative effect of director interlocking were attenuated, the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive. The estimated results indicate that the coefficient of INTERLOCK*SIZE was positive in all specifications, but statistically insignificant in some cases. Therefore, it is likely that bank size had some relationship to the nature of director interlocking, but the continuous relationship is not robust. Furthermore, we re-estimated Equation (2) Table 6a, 6b reports the estimated results of Equation (2) 
Interlocking and bank closure
Next, we focus on evaluation of banks in the financial market. As stock price data are available for only a small number of banks, we use the data on bank runs and closures, which were analyzed by Yabushita and Inoue. 76 They proposed a simple model in which the probability of closure principally increased with a fall in the net liquidity position of a bank. Using this model, they investigated the relationship between individual banks' financial positions and the probability of closure during the Showa Financial Crisis. They confirmed the fundamental bank runs view that the poor performance of bank portfolios increased the probability of closure due to bank runs. 7778 Based on their model, we estimate the cumulative distribution function F of the probability of bank runs by the LOGIT model.
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73 We also ran regressions using the number of interlocks normalized by bank assets and the natural log of bank assets, and confirmed that the effects of these two variables were still negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or the 1% level. 74 In estimation, we used LN(FIRM+1). 75 We also estimated equation (2), substituting ROA (the ratio of profit to total deposit plus the book value of capital) and the loan deposit ratio for ROE. LN(INTERLOCK) had a negative effect on ROA and a positive effect on loan-deposit ratios. 76 Yabushita and Inoue, "The Stability". 77 Gorton, "Bank Suspension." 78 During the Showa Financial Crisis, two waves of bank runs occurred. Korenaga, Nagase, and Teranishi. "1927 nen" foundthat bank runs in the first wave were information-based but that the second was triggered by self-fulfilling beliefs of depositors, using the data of deposit growth. However, with respect to bank closures, they could not provide evidence of self-fulfilling bank runs. 79 We also conducted ordered LOGIT regressions, considering the possibility that a closure was worse than a run. The result was similar to that in CAPDEPO is defined as the book value of capital divided by total deposits. A high value for this ratio means that the ratio of liability exposed to withdrawal by depositors is low. Hence, we expect that CAPDEPO would have negative effects on the probability of a run or closure. RESDEPO and LOANDEPO are defined as bank deposit reserves, and total loans divided by total deposits, respectively.
These two ratios are directly related to the liquidity position of a bank. If a bank has sufficient bank deposit reserves, it is unlikely to be faced with a run or closure, because it can accommodate withdrawal demands by depositors. On the other hand, because it is not easy to liquidate bank loans immediately, a bank with a high LOANDEPO is likely to be exposed to a run or closure even in the event of minor liquidity shocks.
The other independent variables are the same as those defined in Section 4.1. A bank with a high value of ROE is unlikely to be exposed to a run or closure. SIZE and EQ are included to control the credit risk factor, which could increase a bank's probability of a run or closure. The larger the bank, the more likely it is to diversify its loan portfolio or be able to withstand certain negative shocks. Therefore, large 80 Unlike Yabushita and Inoue, "The Stability", we focused not only on bank closures during the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927, but also on bank closures and runs in ordinary years (1928 and 1929) , in order to obtain a broad perspective on evaluation of the financial market. 81 Bank of Japan. "Ginko Jiko Geppo".
banks are generally considered to have low credit risk, compared to smaller banks. As for EQ, banks operating in the area damaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 were expected to suffer from bad loan problems. Hence, such banks were considered to have high credit risk. In sum, we predicted that the coefficient of SIZE would be negative and that of EQ would be positive
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. Finally, LN (INTERLOCK) was included to test the organ bank hypothesis. If the market perceived director interlocking between a bank and companies as unfavourable, the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) would be positive. Table 7 reports the results of the LOGIT estimation. Columns 1 and 2 are the results for all banks.
In Column 1, the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is positive but not significant. Furthermore, Column 2
shows that this coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, after we adjust for the four financial ratios. Therefore, in respect of all banks, we could not obtain strong evidence that the market negatively assessed the connection of banks with non-banking companies. As for other control variables, whereas the coefficient of SIZE is positive in Column 1, this positive effect disappears after adjusting for financial ratios (Column 2). EQ shows no significant effect. On the other hand, the indications of all the coefficients of the financial ratios were as expected, and the coefficients of CAPDEPO and LOANDEPO were statistically significant. These results imply that, basically, the financial position of a bank better explains the probability of closure or a run than other factors, which is consistent with Yabushita and Inoue.
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Columns 3 and 4 report the results for smaller banks. In Column 3, it is confirmed that the coefficient of LN(INTERLOCK) is positive and statistically significant. Also, the magnitude is much greater compared with that of Column 1. In Column 4, the positive effect of LN(INTERLOCK) is still significant after adjusting for financial ratios. These results indicate that, for smaller banks, director 82 Yabushita and Inoue "The Stability" used the Tokyo area dummy instead of EQ. However, the Tokyo area dummy was positive but statistically insignificant in cases where we substitute it for EQ. 83 Yabushita and Inoue "The Stability".
interlocking was evaluated as negative information by the market, in addition to poor financial position.
On the other hand, it is confirmed in Columns 5-8 that director interlocking had no effect on the probability of closure or a run in respect of medium-sized and large banks. In sum, the finding that the effects of director interlocking were harmful to smaller banks, but to larger banks, is still robust, even if we use probability of closure or a run as a performance measure.
Concluding remarks
More than forty years ago, Kato proposed the organ bank hypothesis: that in pre-war Japan many banks controlled by industrial companies through capital and personal relationships, engaged in unsound lending to their related companies, which damaged the banks' financial positions, and consequently destabilized the financial system. 84 This view has become one of the fundamental hypotheses on Japanese financial history, but has not been examined quantitatively.
In this paper, we examined the organ bank hypothesis, using the data on director interlocking between banks and non-banking companies. We found that more than 80% of ordinary banks had at least one director or auditor who was also a director or auditor of a non-banking company. Also, through regression analyses, we confirmed that director interlocking had negative effects on bank performance, and that these effects were serious, especially for smaller banks. Our findings support the organ bank hypothesis.
As stated in section 1, the organ bank relationship can be regarded as a case of related lending suffered from "looting," which is widely observed in present developing countries. 85 This perception leads us to an interesting future research topic. That is the fate of the organ bank relationship in the 84 Kato, Honpo Ginkoshi Ron. 85 La Porta, Rafel, Lopez-Silanes, and Zamarrip, "Related Lending."
process of economic and financial development. Did the organ bank relationship disappear after the 1920s? If so, how did that come about? One hypothesis we have in mind is a "natural selection"
hypothesis. 86 Given that the organ bank relationship compromised the soundness of bank loans, we can expect that organ banks would be more likely to be forced out of the market than other banks. In other words, if the mechanism of selection by market forces was effective, surviving banks would be expected to demonstrate fewer characteristics of organ banks. Because there were many banks in pre-war Japan, this is a good opportunity to examine whether such "natural selection" actually worked or not, which would have a substantial implication to understand the evolution of institutions. At the same time, if the natural selection did not work effectively, it might imply that some government regulation on related rending is needed in present developing countries. These issues remain to be addressed by future studies.
edited by T. Yabushita, Shiro, and Atsushi Inoue. "The Stability of the Japanese Banking System: A Historical
Perspective." Journal of the Japanese and International Economies l.7, no.4 (1993):387-407.
Appendix : Two stage estimation of Equation (2)
In order to deal with the potential endogeneity, we estimated Equation (2) by two stage least square method, using the age of a bank and the prefecture dummies as instrumental variables for INTERLOCK. The basic idea is that since an organ bank was, by definition, established to fund related non-banking companies, arguably an organ bank in its early stages would have been firmly controlled by its founders, who were bank directors. Then, as the banks matured, the influence of the founders generally would be attenuated, as compared with the early stage situation. 87 Hence, bank age was expected to have a negative effect on INTERLOCK. In respect of prefecture dummies, we considered that director interlocking between banks and non-banking companies was affected to greater or lesser extent by the structures of individual regional economies. 88 In the first stage, INTERLOCK was regressed on bank age 87 Morikawa, Nihon Keieishi defined a professional manager as a manager who was not a major shareholder of the company where he worked, but was expected to play only a management role, and investigated the ratio of professional managers among the board members, in respect of large companies, including banks, in 1905, 1912 and 1930 . According to his calculations, the number of professional managers gradually increased during this period. 88 According to Shiratori, Shiratori, "1920 Nendai", the reason for the Bank Law of 1927 not completely and prefecture dummies and other exogenous variables by OLS. The coefficient of bank age was negative and statistically significant. In the second stage, we estimated Equation (2), using the result of the first stage regression. 89 Appendix Table 2 reports the results of the second stage regressions. In respect of the results for all banks (Columns 1 and 2), the coefficients of LN(INTERLOCK) are still negative and statistically significant. Also, the effect of interlocking was particularly negative for smaller banks.
prohibiting director interlocking between banks and companies was that the government took account of the situation in some rural areas, where it was unavoidable that some powerful and reputable persons held directorships in banks as well as in non-banking companies. 89 In the second stage estimation of tobit model, we use the asymptotically efficient estimator proposed by Newey, "Efficient Estimation". Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". The figures in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Significance levels are reported for two-tail tests. Definitions of the variables can be found in the appendix.
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